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Mary Guy, COMPETITION POLICY IN HEALTHCARE: FRONTIERS IN INSURANCE-BASED AND 
TAXATION-FUNDED SYSTEMS Cambridge: Intersentia (www.intersentia.com), 2019, xxxix + 262 pp. 
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In popular discourse in European contexts, and certainly in the UK, the idea that healthcare should 
be subject to the rules that apply to ordinary markets is highly controversial. Just this week (early 
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effect that Trump seeks to use a post-Brexit UK-US trade deal to  ?open up the NHS ? to American 
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If, like me, you are regularly infuriated by the imprecision of broad-brush sentiments like these, 
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world of difference between competition between, for instance, global pharmaceutical companies, 
supplying NHS hospitals and pharmacies where patients rely on free or heavily subsidised NHS 
prescriptions; and competition between independent physicians, or privately-owned companies, 
supplying long-term care, or emergency health services, to patients or to the social insurance 
entities with whom they are insured. There is a world of difference between looking at demand-side 
factors (like number of providers and availability of transparent information on services or products 
provided); supply-side factors (like barriers to entry to a market, for instance because of technology 
access); and institutional factors (like the formal legal forms of ownership of entities, including 
private capital, public/private initiatives, (re-)nationalised). And there is a world of difference 
between the specificities of how competition could, and does, apply within different health systems. 
In order to understand the implications, we need granular analysis, of actual healthcare systems, 
and the (competition) law that applies to them. That is what this book provides. 
At the heart of the book is a carefully justified, rigorous and thorough analysis of the detailed rules 
of the two European healthcare systems that have gone the furthest with embracing competition 
law: the Netherlands and England. Guy is careful to distinguish the English NHS from the rest of the 
UK: Scotland, for instance, has not adopted the approach discussed here. The reader is treated to a 
historical and contemporary account which puts the reforms to the Dutch and English health 
systems, and the legislative changes that bring them into effect, into their context. One important 
contextual aspect  ? sometimes lost in solely doctrinally-focused treatises on the subject  ? is the 
difference between the potential (yet in the realms of merely theoretical) applicability of 
competition law in health systems, and its actual application. This latter goes to questions of 
practical enforcement, with all the resourcing implications that apply. The different institutional 
arrangements between the two systems (one essentially social insurance based, one essential 
taxation based) are carefully outlined, so that the reader is then equipped to understand how 
aspects of competition law and policy can (and do) apply in each system.  
dŚĞ ďŽŽŬ ?Ɛ ŬĞǇ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ 'ƵǇ ?s original analytical structure. Through this, the reader can 
understand each of the two systems, and thus how competition law and policy applies, and could 
apply in the future, leading to an assessment of its feasibility and desirability. The models are crucial 
for the reader to make sense of the nuance in the legal and conceptual analysis, and in this regard 
they work exceptionally well. Guy begins by distinguishing the macro, meso and micro levels of a 
healthcare system. At the macro level, ministers, competition authorities and health sector 
regulators determine where competition can take place, and where (and what type of) regulation is 
necessary or desirable. The meso level, occupied by social insurers and/or commissioners of health 
services, links this level to the micro level, where healthcare providers (hospitals, clinics, general 
practitioners and specialists) offer healthcare services.  Guy then develops two frameworks through 
which the detailed analytical work of the book is sustained. For the Netherlands, with its mandatory 
system of private health insurance introduced in 2006 ? 'ƵǇ ?Ɛ ƚŚƌĞĞ-part model distinguishes 
patients, insurers and providers. The logic of the system is that efficiency arises from competition 
between insurers, and between providers, which compete among and between themselves for 
patients. By contrast, fŽƌ ŶŐůĂŶĚ ? ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚĞ  ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? 'ƵǇ ?Ɛ ŵŽĚĞů ŚĞůƉƐ ƵƐ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
distinction between four different categories of English healthcare: essentially all the possible 
modalities between public/private and purchaser/provider. The logic here is about distinguishing 
strictly between the NHS and the private healthcare sector, and the reach of general competition 
law. The logic of competition law applies in the private purchaser/private provider context as if 
healthcare were the same as any other regulated market sector. But competition logics also apply in 
the public purchaser/public provider context, for instance, where public providers compete for 
contracts with NHS commissioners (now Clinical Commissioning Groups); and where the NHS 
contracts with private clinics to offer treatment to NHS patients (public purchaser/private provider). 
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of solidarity as the lodestar of European health systems, and the underlying framework of EU 
competition law.  The former explains why a narrative to the effect that healthcare is sufficiently 
similar to other sectors for the application of general competition law is deficient.  A better 
justificatory narrative concerns competition as a means to an end: in particular, to modernise health 
systems and respond to increasing costs springing from increasing patient demands and an ageing 
population.  Here, the key question is the extent to which values associated with solidaristic 
healthcare provision  ? equal access to high quality healthcare on the basis of medical need, not 
ability to pay  ? can be pursued within a competition policy framework, and how competition law can 
embed those values.  EU competition law provides, through its exemption and exception measures, 
a significant margin of appreciation to domestic policy-makers.  Hence, there is room for different 
member states (and devolved entities with competence over healthcare within those member 
states) to take quite different approaches to the application of competition law to their NHS.  A 
focus on both solidarity and EU competition law highlights the benefits, and, crucially, the 
limitations, of competition reforms.  Here, the Dutch and English cases ŽĨ  ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ? 
provide important learning points for other European states. 
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